Nelson's history of the war. Vol. XI., The struggle for the Dvina, and the great invasion of Serbia

40 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

mize the difficulties of withdrawal, but they insisted upon the greater difficulties of remaining. On the purely military side, it was clear that if we were to fight a campaign in any part of the Balkans, and if speed was the essence of the undertaking, then the only troops which could be put in the field soon were those drawn from Gallipoli. But, on the other hand, it was urged that soldiers who had fought for months in cramped trench battles should not be forthwith used for a manceuvre campaign in an open country. They must be given an interval for rest and reorganization. Finally, there was a natural reluctance to leave the old battle-ground which had cost us so dear. This was especially felt by the Anzac corps, who regarded the Gallipoli heights as sacred ground, the burial-place of their friends, which it was a point of honour to redeem from the enemy.

Such were a few of the difficulties to be faced in any decision. On 16th October Sir Ian Hamilton was recalled to London to * report,” and General Sir Charles Monro, commanding the British Third Army, was appointed to the command of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force. General Monro had won a great reputation in the West, first in command of the 2nd Division, and then of the First Corps. He is a soldier somewhat after the Peninsular type, with admirable nerve, great sagacity and judgment, and the gift of inspiring confidence in all who serve with him. No better man could have been found for this responsible and arduous task. Meantime, about the middle of September two divisions were withdrawn from Gallipoli—the roth British, under Sir Bryan Mahon,