RTV Theory and Practice - Special Issue

FIGURE TWO : COMPARATIVE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF BROADCASTING

Within this general framework , the nature of radio poses special problems which focus the dilemmas rather sharply . The problems arise more ог less directly from the fact that while TV programs , particularly ones transmitted by cable and/or satellite , аге expensive to produce anđ distribute, rađio is cheap to set up and run . The sheer scale of television means that there аге relatively few players involved. It does not follow inevitably that the process of de-regulation will mean serious problems for existmg companies and their share-holders and it is most unlikely that the new competitors will be of an undesirable type . Those who do estabiish themselves will have considerable resources investeđ m their projects and will thus be extremely vulnerable to the pressures of regulatory bodies . In radio , there is no telling who might be able to set up a station and , given that they will be operating with very much smaller resources , they might be much more willing to take risks than their bigger brothers and sisters . We can see this tension between the pressure to deregulate and the concern with controlling the output of radio fairly clearly if we look briefly at some aspects of the history of local broadcasting. Although the British radio system has from the eariiest days been subject to commercial competition , first based m near contmental neighbors with more permissive regulations like Luxembourg and then, in the 1960'5, from sea-borne 'pirate' commercial broadcasters , it was not until 1972 that commercial radio broadcasting was establisheđ in the UK . It was introduced as a complement to the recently-established BBC local radio service anđ was set up in response to a senes of pressures from would-be broadcasters and advertisers (Local Radio Workshop. 1983: 7-20). From the start, there was gutte heavy regulation both of ownership and program content . Not only were the 60 potential broadcasting compames to be distmct anđ separate entities rather than

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Ownership Scale Control Scale High State input USSR USSR t UK | 1 UK V USA USA Low State Input